[BK PATCH] LSM changes for 2.5.58

Greg KH (greg@kroah.com)
Thu, 16 Jan 2003 15:24:05 -0800


These changesets contain some changes to a few security hooks. They
have all been posted recently, and changes have been made to them based
on feedback.

Please pull from:
bk://lsm.bkbits.net/linus-2.5

thanks,

greg k-h

fs/dcache.c | 3 +++
fs/exportfs/expfs.c | 5 ++---
fs/file_table.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
fs/namei.c | 9 +++------
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 9 +++------
fs/super.c | 8 ++++++++
include/linux/fs.h | 5 ++++-
include/linux/security.h | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------
kernel/ksyms.c | 3 ++-
kernel/sys.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
security/dummy.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
11 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
-----

ChangeSet@1.956, 2003-01-16 14:54:42-08:00, sds@epoch.ncsc.mil
[PATCH] Restore LSM hook calls to setpriority and setpgid

This patch restores the LSM hook calls in setpriority and setpgid to
2.5.58. These hooks were previously added as of 2.5.27, but the hook
calls were subsequently lost as a result of other changes to the code
as of 2.5.37.

Ingo has signed off on this patch, and no one else has objected.

kernel/sys.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
1 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
------

ChangeSet@1.955, 2003-01-16 14:35:24-08:00, sds@epoch.ncsc.mil
[PATCH] allocate and free security structures for private files

This patch adds a security_file_alloc call to init_private_file and
creates a close_private_file function to encapsulate the release of
private file structures. These changes ensure that security
structures for private files will be allocated and freed
appropriately. Per Andi Kleen's comments, the patch also renames
init_private_file to open_private_file to force updating of all
callers, since they will also need to be updated to use
close_private_file to avoid a leak of the security structure. Per
Christoph Hellwig's comments, the patch also replaces the 'mode'
argument with a 'flags' argument, computing the f_mode from the flags,
and it explicitly tests f_op prior to dereferencing, as in
dentry_open().

fs/exportfs/expfs.c | 5 ++---
fs/file_table.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 9 +++------
include/linux/fs.h | 5 ++++-
kernel/ksyms.c | 3 ++-
5 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
------

ChangeSet@1.954, 2003-01-16 14:23:59-08:00, sds@epoch.ncsc.mil
[PATCH] Replace inode_post_lookup hook with d_instantiate hook

This patch removes the security_inode_post_lookup hook entirely and
adds a security_d_instantiate hook call to the d_instantiate function
and the d_splice_alias function. The inode_post_lookup hook was
subject to races since the inode is already accessible through the
dcache before it is called, didn't handle filesystems that directly
populate the dcache, and wasn't always called in the desired context
(e.g. for pipe, shmem, and devpts inodes). The d_instantiate hook
enables initialization of the inode security information. This hook
is used by SELinux and by DTE to setup the inode security state, and
eliminated the need for the inode_precondition function in SELinux.

fs/dcache.c | 3 +++
fs/namei.c | 9 +++------
include/linux/security.h | 25 ++++++++++---------------
security/dummy.c | 13 +++++++------
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
------

ChangeSet@1.953, 2003-01-16 14:18:05-08:00, sds@epoch.ncsc.mil
[PATCH] Add LSM hook to do_kern_mount

This patch adds a security_sb_kern_mount hook call to the do_kern_mount
function. This hook enables initialization of the superblock security
information of all superblock objects. Placing a hook in do_kern_mount
was originally suggested by Al Viro. This hook is used by SELinux to
setup the superblock security state and eliminated the need for the
superblock_precondition function.

fs/super.c | 8 ++++++++
include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
security/dummy.c | 6 ++++++
3 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
------

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