²⁸The Enchiridion, Paragraph 5, trans. G. Long. For example, if I think that what somebody else just did belongs to the category “rude”, perhaps I should not be so certain about such inference. I can start with considering if my perception was incorrect: I may have completely misunderstood what he was doing, or what his goal was. From the viewpoint of contextuality, I might consider if in this particular situation, his behavior was actually just right—or maybe I am in a foreign culture and don’t know the rules. From the viewpoint of subjectivity, I might wonder if other people found his behavior commendable and if it is just me who finds such behavior rude. From the viewpoint of fuzziness, I might ask: How does one define rudeness anyway, is there a well-defined criterion? Fuzziness is actually something whose effect on suffering we have not yet considered in detail, although it is an important concept—if not under this term—in relevant philosophical systems, such as Zen and the Pyrrhonian Skeptics. Chapter 8 argued that while conceptual thinking uses crisp categories, many of the things in the world are fuzzy. If you categorize events which are only borderline rude as simply rude, that is a form of overgeneralization: you may then be suffering unnecessarily due to your crisp-categorical thinking. The effect of fuzziness on suffering thus seems strongly analogous to the effect of uncertainty.