⁷This very well-known quote from The Enchiridion may not give a very clear idea of what exactly Epictetus considered to be under our control. In his Discourses, a more detailed picture emerges, but it is not entirely consistent. He usually says that one of the following two things is the only thing under our control: either the “will” (prohairesis, e.g. Discourses, I.22.10), or what he calls the “use of impressions” (e.g. Discourses, I.1.7, I.12.34). The latter includes the judgement of good and bad, as well as judgement of (moral) right and wrong (Discourses, III.22.42). For Epictetus, an impression (phantasia) seems to be what we would call “percept(ion)”, although according to Long (2002, Sec. 5.1) it encompasses the “thoughts and states of consciousness in general”. It may be that for Epictetus the use of impressions and the will are two sides of the same coin, as discussed at length by Girdwood (1998), since the correct use of impressions is necessary and sufficient for the correct use of the will (Discourses, I.1.12, I.30.4, II.1.4).