Not the above - that one is obvious that the key can be compromised.
> Maybe you're talking about hibernation rather than suspension. (when
> everything is written to disk and the memory is wiped). In this case,
> again, the encrypted swap's key is the least of your concern since all
> your memory is written to disk plaintext anyway. If hibernation is
> implemented in software, you can have it encrypted too, and require a
> user-supplied key upon restarting. If its implemented by the hardware, I
> guess there isn't much you can do. Just have the kernel do the
> hibernation into an encrypted loopdev and halt the machine.
This one...
Though part of it has to do with large systems and crash. What is done
on some of these systems is to periodically checkpoint batch jobs. If the
kernel crashes, the job has a physical memory failure, a cpu dies (one out
of many...) the system resumes processing (after reboot, or removing the
memory page from the valid list ... whatever recovery method) to then
reload/resume the processes.
If the random key is lost due to a crash, then reload/resume fails.
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