Re: The disappearing sys_call_table export.

[Chuck Ebbert]

arjanv wrote:

> examle: pseudocode for the unlink syscall
> 
> long your_wrapped_syscall(char *userfilename)
> {
>     char kernelpointer[something];
>     copy_from_user(kernelpointer, usefilename, ...);
>     audit_log(kernelpointer);
>     return original_syscall(userfilename);
> }

  That code has another hole that nobody else has mentioned
yet: I can fill the audit log by trying to delete nonexistent files,
and if accused of trying to mount a DOS attack on the audit trail
I can reasonably claim that it was all an accident...

  How about:

long wrapped_unlink(char *userfilename)
{
        char name1[len], name2[len];
        long ret;

        copy_from_user(name1, userfilename, ...);
        ret = original_unlink(userfilename);
        copy_from_user(name2, userfilename, ...);

        if (strncmp(name1, name2, len))
                audit_log(name1, name2, UNLINK_NAME_CHANGED);
        if (ret == 0 && AUDIT_SUCCESS)
                audit_log(name1, name2, UNLINK_SUCCEEDED);
        if (ret == -EPERM && AUDIT_FAILURE)
                audit_log(name1, name2, UNLINK_FAILED);

        return ret;
}