Re: The disappearing sys_call_table export.

[petter wahlman]

On Wed, 2003-05-07 at 18:59, Richard B. Johnson wrote:
> On Wed, 7 May 2003, petter wahlman wrote:
> 
> > On Wed, 2003-05-07 at 18:00, Richard B. Johnson wrote:
> > > On Wed, 7 May 2003, petter wahlman wrote:
> > >
> > > >
> > > > It seems like nobody belives that there are any technically valid
> > > > reasons for hooking system calls, but how should e.g anti virus
> > > > on-access scanners intercept syscalls?
> > > > Preloading libraries, ptracing init, patching g/libc, etc. are
> > >   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > >                     |________  Is the way to go. That's how
> > > you communicate every system-call to a user-mode daemon that
> > > does whatever you want it to do, including phoning the National
> > > Security Administrator if that's the policy.
> > >
> > > > obviously not the way to go.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Oviously wrong.
> >
> >
> > And how would you force the virus to preload this library?
> >
> > -p.
> >
> 
> The same way you would force a virus to not be statically linked.
> You make sure that only programs that interface with the kernel
> thorugh your hooks can run on that particular system.
> 

Can you please elaborate.
How would you implement the access control without modifying the
respective syscalls or the system_call(), and would you'r
solution be possible to implement run time?

Regards,

-p.