See if this patch fixes your problem. There is a bug in capget(2) which
is called by cap_get_proc(3). I was holding off on submitting this patch
to Linus until the LSM stuff is resolved.
thanks,
-chris
--- 2.5.43/kernel/capability.c Sun Sep 15 12:19:29 2002
+++ 2.5.43-capget/kernel/capability.c Wed Oct 16 00:51:33 2002
@@ -54,15 +54,15 @@
spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
- target = find_task_by_pid(pid);
- if (!target) {
- ret = -ESRCH;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (pid && pid != current->pid) {
+ target = find_task_by_pid(pid);
+ if (!target) {
+ ret = -ESRCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else
+ target = current;
- data.permitted = cap_t(target->cap_permitted);
- data.inheritable = cap_t(target->cap_inheritable);
- data.effective = cap_t(target->cap_effective);
ret = security_ops->capget(target, &data.effective, &data.inheritable, &data.permitted);
out:
--- 2.5.43/security/dummy.c Fri Oct 11 14:22:54 2002
+++ 2.5.43-capget/security/dummy.c Tue Oct 15 00:47:24 2002
@@ -27,6 +27,17 @@
static int dummy_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t * effective,
kernel_cap_t * inheritable, kernel_cap_t * permitted)
{
+ *effective = *inheritable = *permitted = 0;
+ if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
+ if (target->euid == 0) {
+ *permitted |= (~0 & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
+ *effective |= (~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP) & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
+ }
+ if (target->fsuid == 0) {
+ *permitted |= CAP_FS_MASK;
+ *effective |= CAP_FS_MASK;
+ }
+ }
return 0;
}
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