I suspect that Oliver is 100% correct in that the current code is just
_too_ trusting. And parts of his patches seem to be in the "obviously
good" category (ie the xor'ing of the buffers instead of overwriting).
So I think that if we just made the code be much less trusting (say,
consider the TSC information per interrupt to give only a single bit of
entropy, for example), and coupled that with making network devices always
be considered sources of entropy, we'd have a reasonable balance.
Linus
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