Re: prevent breaking a chroot() jail?

[H. Peter Anvin]

Followup to:  <1025877004.11004.59.camel@zaphod>
By author:    Shaya Potter <[e-mail]>
In newsgroup: linux.dev.kernel
>
> I'm trying to develop a way to ensure that one can't break out of a
> chroot() jail, even as root.  I'm willing to change the way the syscalls
> work (most likely only for a subset of processes, i.e. processes that
> are run in the jail end up getting a marker which is passed down to all
> their children that causes the syscalls to behave differently).
> 
> What should I be aware of?  I figure devices (no need to run mknod in
> this jail) and chroot (as per man page), is there any other way of
> breaking the chroot jail (at a syscall level or otherwise)?
> 
> or is this 100% impossible?
> 

This sounds like a job for [dum de dum dum] capabilities... remember,
on Linux root hasn't been almighty for a very long time, it's just a
matter of which capabilities you retain.  Of course, if you really
want to be safe, you might end up with a rather castrated root inside
the chroot shell.

If you really want to jail something, use UML.

	-hpa
-- 
<[e-mail]> at work, <[e-mail]> in private!
"Unix gives you enough rope to shoot yourself in the foot."
http://www.zytor.com/~hpa/puzzle.txt	<[e-mail]>