Re: link() security

[H. Peter Anvin]

Followup to:  <[e-mail]>
By author:    "Patrick J. LoPresti" <[e-mail]>
In newsgroup: linux.dev.kernel
> Actually, that is a horrible policy from a security perspective.  The
> shared mail spool itself is a poor design and always has been.
> 
> A better design is to use a separate spool directory for each user
> (/var/spool/mail/user/ or ~user/mail/ or somesuch), and only allow
> that user to access it at all.  This solves *all* of the security
> problems you mention:
> 
>    *) It avoids attacks based on race conditions, because you cannot
>       create files in somebody else's spool.
> 
>    *) Admins can manage space with quotas or partitions just like they
>       do for user home directories (i.e., it is a solved problem).
> 
>    *) You cannot link() to somebody else's spool file because you
>       cannot even read the directory in which it resides.
> 
> The solution to a fundamentally broken spool design is to fix that
> design, not to patch the kernel in nonstandard ways to plug just one
> of its multiple flaws.

Not to mention the fact that the single file mailbox design is itself
flawed.  Mailboxes are fundamentally directories, which news server
authors quickly realized.

	-hpa
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