In the Usenix paper quoted earlier in this thread (I believe) it was
stated that the MIL-SPEC document was actually bogus. REAL secure
deletion requirements were much more strict (something like 15 passes of
various random and non-random patterns vs. 7 passes of alternating all 0
and all 1 data), but the US government made it think that the MIL-SPEC
requirements were enough, so that naive users would follow it, still
leaving enough trace data on the disk for the government to retrieve it.
Still, even a single pass of zero writes is enough to prevent 99.9%
of attackers from getting the data back.
Cheers, Andreas
-- Andreas Dilger \ "If a man ate a pound of pasta and a pound of antipasto, \ would they cancel out, leaving him still hungry?" http://www-mddsp.enel.ucalgary.ca/People/adilger/ -- Dogbert- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/