Two means to minimize this cost are (a) in userspace encrypt the data
before leaving it stored in memory or (b) have a flag that marks a given
page as _PAGE_ENCRYPTION so that only that page is encrypted while the
rest of the pages are left alone.
The first solution is userspace only and portable across all other
mediums. The second solution minimizes cost at the granular level of a
page boundary.
In any given case, physical access renders most solutions void or
significantly paled. I am not however of the opinion that the concept
should be dropped. I firmly believe in layered security, not a
one-stop-solution. That is to say that I will layer thin or weak
security just as I would add heavy security. Simply making your data
look uninviting is sufficient to drive away most would-be's.
David
Marty Poulin wrote:
>>You can't guarantee much if the machine is physically compromised. In
>>the situation of wiping, you probably won't need swap immediately after
>>boot so you can afford to execute a script that wipes the file/partition
>>then mounts it.
>>
>>It's all easily accomplished in userspace.
>>
>>David
>>
>This all depends on what the circumstances are. If you are talking about
>someone being able to walk up to the machine while on and pull the memory
>cards, nope we cant stop that with the OS.
>
>That is not what we are trying to do, one of the specific scenarios was the
>example of a notebook computer that either was shut off quickly or freezes.
>If this notebook is stolen before the system is rebooted presto the crook
>has access to everything in the swap. All he has to do is take out the
>drive and put it in another system.
>
>The solution to that is encrypted swap.
>
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/