encrypted swap

[David Maynor]

 >This is nonsense.  Of course the computer can do this.  This is exactly 
what we
 >already do for TCP sequence numbers, disk UUIDS, and many other things.
 >Granted, we need a little more initial entropy, but the principle has already
 >been established.

 >Remember that this is not the same as a crypted filesystem in that no user
 >(even root) need ever have any access to the key.  That's important.  Because
 >the swapspace is essentially wiped at powerup, the system can happily gen 
a new
 >key every boot, crypt away and never let the users know the key at all.

This is a should-if debate, in my opinion. That is, not if you can do it, 
but should you. Has anybody thought of the performance hit that you would 
take encrypting your swap?

David Maynor