Re: Encrypted Swap

[Michael Bacarella]

> Apparently some of you have missed the point.  Currently, the only way to
> write any form of encryption application is to have it run setuid root so
> it can lock pages in RAM.  Otherwise, files (or keys) that are encrypted
> on disk may be left in an unencrypted state on swap, allowing for
> potential recovery by anyone with hardware access.  Encrypted swap makes
> locking pages unnecessary, which relieves many sysadmins from the anxiety
> of having yet-another-setuid application installed on their server in
> addition to freeing up additional pages to be swapped.

Not to trivialize your burden as a sys admin, but if you don't think
you're going to run into swap often (not quoted), and feel that it's
a security hazard... why not disable swap entirely?

If a system dips into swap, maybe it doesn't have enough RAM.
And if security is that important to you, dropping the cash on the
additional RAM should be a non-issue.

Besides, who can argue against more RAM?

-- 
Michael Bacarella <[e-mail]>
Technical Staff / System Development,
New York Connect.Net, Ltd.