> H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> >By author: Jorgen Cederlof <jc@lysator.liu.se>
> >> If we only allow user chroots for processes that have never been
> >> chrooted before, and if the suid/sgid bits won't have any effect under
> >> the new root, it should be perfectly safe to allow any user to chroot.
> >
> >Safe, perhaps, but also completely useless: there is no way the user
> >can set up a functional environment inside the chroot.
>
> Why is it useless? It sounds useful to me, on first glance. If I want
> to run a user-level network daemon I don't trust (for instance, fingerd),
> isolating it in a chroot area sounds pretty nice: If there is a buffer
> overrun in the daemon, you can get some protection [*] against the rest
> of your system being trashed. Am I missing something obvious?
Just write a small program that chroots, drop privileges, and
execs the untrusted daemon.
.TM.
--
____/ ____/ /
/ / / Marco Colombo
___/ ___ / / Technical Manager
/ / / ESI s.r.l.
_____/ _____/ _/ Colombo@ESI.it
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