¹⁷Thus, such negative emotions seem to introduce a mechanism for suffering which may be a bit different from what has been discussed previously, at least in the sense of introducing a new kind of an error signal. But it is also possible that it is not really different from the frustration-based and self-based mechanisms treated in the preceding chapters. One can argue that just as we already reduced fear to frustration in Chapter 6, we can reduce the other negative emotions to frustration of self-needs. If an interrupt is triggered, that means something went “wrong” from the viewpoint of survival or threat-avoidance, and thus such self-needs were frustrated. What matters really from the viewpoint of this book is which theoretical approach is useful from the viewpoint of interventions. Frustration is an error signal on which we can actually intervene, and many methods will be discussed in Chapters 14 and 15. It may be more difficult to intervene on the interrupts of fear and disgust, for example (but Chapter 15 discusses  🡭, some possibilities related to threat and  🡭 related to desires). So, it might be more practical if the framework of frustration (including frustration of self-needs) were sufficient to explain the appearance of suffering even in the case of emotions. I leave details of such connections for future work to elaborate.